The US government initially 'opposed the AIIB's creation and reportedly urged its allies and partners in Europe and in Asia not to join the AIIB' (Weiss 2017, 5) . It was worried that the bank would be 'a bank of China, by China and for China' (Ito 2015, 2) . Similar to the role of the USA in the World Bank group, China currently makes the single largest contribution to the AIIB, accounting for 33.41 percent of its capital share and holding 28.79 percent of the voting rights. This provides China with de facto veto power over crucial issues (for example, its structural reform) that would require a 75 percent majority. In addition, compared with other multilateral development banks, the powers delegated to the AIIB's board of directors are substantially modest (Weiss 2017, 9) . With a non-resident board of directors, it is argued that the financing operations may tend to reflect the opinions of the AIIB president and executives, which are obviously dominated by China (Ito 2015, 4) . The Obama administration, in particular, articulated two major concerns over the AIIB. First, it would be an institution designed to compete for clients as well as influence with the existing multilateral development banks: the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Second, there were concerns in Washington that the existing US-dominated Bretton Woods institutions' international influence and clout, particularly on rule-setting, would be diminished (Ito 2015; Nelson 2015, 17-18) . Critics have argued that China would likely apply its rules and standards in project-lending, ultimately undermining the liberal norms and rules espoused by the US-dominated Bretton Woods institutions. With these misgivings, Washington tried to lobby the USA's key allies, especially the UK, against joining the AIIB. The US position on the AIIB showed Washington's hidden reservations about integrating China into the existing liberal international order. Nevertheless, Washington's efforts to delegitimise and marginalise the AIIB have 'failed miserably' (Drezner 2015; Feigenbaum 2017) . After the UK's unexpected announcement to be the first Group of Seven country to seek membership of the AIIB in March 2015, to the ire of the Obama administration (Dyer and Parker 2015; Watt, Lewis, and Branigan 2015) , other US allies-Germany, France, Italy, Australia and South Korea-quickly jumped on the bandwagon to join as founding members of this new development bank.
The focus of the analysis thus far has been, in the first place, on the USA's policy concerns and the tug of war between the USA and its major allies. In explaining why China initiated the AIIB, the existing accounts can be summarised as follows: (1) huge demand for infrastructure investment in various Asian countries that goes beyond the financial capabilities of the established development banks (Wang 2015) ; (2) China's need to export its production overcapacity in order to arrest its domestic economic slowdown; (3) China's perception of the USA's relative decline during China's ascendancy since 2008; (4) China's displeasure at the sluggish pace of institutional reform of the international financial institutions; and (5) Xi Jinping's decision to give up Deng's policy dictum of 'keeping a low profile in international affairs' (for accounts of these arguments, see Chan and Lee 2017; Etzioni 2016; Prasad 2016, 226-234; Ren 2016; Weiss 2017; Yu 2016) . A deeper question has, however, been left unaddressed: Was there any strategic rationale, apart from economic and commercial reasons, for China to establish a new multilateral development bank?
Few attempts have been made to attribute China's major, path-breaking move to create a multilateral development bank by itself to its policy response to an imminent external threat from the USA. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, China's economy grew rapidly, enabling it to become the second-largest economy in the world after 2010. However, until late 2013, China had never shown its intention to establish a multilateral development bank. Why did China not establish the AIIB under Hu Jintao or earlier? The existing accounts are idiosyncratically inclined to attribute the policy change to Xi's ideology, without going into sufficient details of the underlying factors of his policy. In order to fill this gap, this article provides an alternative account of the rationale for setting up a China-led multilateral development bank by resorting to an old neorealist theorybalance of power-and connecting it to a signature foreign policy of the Obama administration-namely, the strategic rebalance to Asia. In the face of that threat, China began to take steps to set up the AIIB and the associated OBOR project, although it was about to be swiftly accorded more clout in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
This article proceeds in five steps. First, it deals with the Obama administration's signature foreign policy-the rebalance to Asia-and how China has felt threatened by it. This is followed by an account of the theory of soft balancing and its relevance to the study of the establishment of the AIIB. The third and fourth sections, respectively, discuss the institutional origins of the AIIB and OBOR and their 'separation', and China's 'march West' towards Eurasia strategy. An assessment of China's soft-balancing policy is made in the final section.
The USA's 'pivot to Asia' policy
In the middle of the Obama administration's first term, Washington launched a rebalancing foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific through the notion of a 'pivot to Asia'. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to maintain the domination and supremacy of the US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region in the face of 'China's rise'. The USA often harbours the view that a rising China will strive to drive it out of the Asia-Pacific, undermining the peace and security of the region.
As part of this 'pivot to Asia' policy, the USA has expanded its military presence by strengthening the existing alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific. It has deployed more troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore, and further expanded its military cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea. Australia is one of the key actors of the Obama administration's Asia pivot. In 2011, both countries agreed to deploy 2500 US Marines to Darwin, a city in northern Australia. In addition, Canberra also grants the USA access to its Naval Communication Station in Western Australia, including the space-surveillance radar system there (Wood 2015, 140) . In Singapore, the USA has also been allowed to have access to Changi Naval Base, the Port of Singapore Authority's Sembawang Terminal and the Paya Lebar Air Base (Wood 2015, 143) . More US naval forces were deployed to the Pacific Ocean than to the Atlantic Ocean under Obama's Asia-Pacific rebalance (60 percent versus 40 percent) (Hang 2016, 298) . Overall, although the naval assets only increased by 2 percent in comparison with the George W. Bush administration, it has been argued that this 2 percent increment does make 'a difference in terms of perception, signal of intent and actual capability' (ibid.).
In Japan, while the USA has tried to reduce its visible 'footprint' by relocating 7000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam in order to reduce the resentment generated by the presence of US troops among the Japanese public, Washington has been simultaneously substantially upgrading the capabilities of US forces based in Japan. Patriot interceptors and powerful X-band radar systems, designed to track long-range missiles, have been deployed (Lord and Erickson 2014) .
With regard to South Korea, under Obama's 'pivot to Asia' policy, the USA has substantially boosted its military presence on the Korean Peninsula. During the George W. Bush administration, Washington withdrew 40 percent of US troops from South Korea, as well as reducing the scale and frequency of military exercises between the two countries. However, Obama carried out the 'largest joint military exercises with South Korea since the Korean War', and its troop presence between Seoul and the demilitarised zone that divides North and South Korea has also increased (Ross 2012, 78) . In addition, the deployment of the Terminal High Attitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system from the USA to South Korea has incurred China's wrath (as will be discussed further below). Beijing perceives this as a threat to its national security for its role in changing the balance of power in the region.
Apart from a strengthening of the USA's traditional 'hub-and-spoke' alliance system, more detrimental to Chinese interests is that the USA has encouraged its Asian allies, especially Japan and Australia, and India to cement military ties among themselves. Since March 2013, the USA's rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region has expanded into an 'Indo-Asia-Pacific rebalance' by bringing India into the fold. These so-called 'mini-lateral' or 'pluri-lateral' structures can combine the strengths of both bilateralism and multilateralism in developing a network of US allies (Tow and Envall 2011, 62) . Obviously, their common target is a rising China.
Economically, Washington has also tried to maintain its dominant position in the regional economic order by pushing ahead with a 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. The TPP was not initiated by the USA, but by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. The USA decided to join the negotiations in 2008 in the final year of George W. Bush's administration. The succeeding Obama administration included it in its rebalancing policy (Christensen 2016, 248-249; Ren 2017, 245) . Until January 2017, when the Trump administration declared its withdrawal from the TPP (Williams and Fergusson 2017) , it was allegedly the largest pact governing international commerce, encompassing 40 percent of the world's economic output, and deemed to be a key economic component of Obama's 'pivot' (Manyin et al. 2012 ). However, China, the second-largest economy, was excluded. Although China had expressed interest in joining the TPP negotiations (Ren 2017, 250) , the standards that the Obama administration set for China on various issues of human rights, transparency and state-owned enterprises, and a crackdown on hacking and cyber industrial espionage, were 'so high as they … effectively precluded [China's] participation' (Etzioni 2016, 183) . Despite Hanoi's equally dismal human rights record, Washington invited Vietnam, which was seen as a strategic counterweight to the rise of China, to join the TPP (Nakamura 2015) . The TPP was later pitted against the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, in which Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nation states-without the USA-were negotiating (Ren 2017, 246) . The USA also blocked the Chinese move to kick-start the formation of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific in November 2014, when China was hosting an AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Leaders' Meeting (Ren 2017, 247-248) .
US executive policy statements often conveyed two self-contradictory aims to two divergent audiences. They sought to reassure Beijing that Washington's intentions were benign and, at the same time, to reassure the American public and the USA's allies that the USA would not allow a rising China to threaten the USA's hegemonic status (Heritage 2017, 145) . Behind the coexistence of various schemes of free trade in the Asia-Pacific was a battle over which country would be leading in writing the rules for regional trade (Christensen 2016, 314-315) . 3 The centrality of the TPP project for the Obama administration was therefore about 'geopolitics, not economics'-about preventing China from developing a growing sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific region (Bradsher 2015) . As Amitai Etzioni (2016) argues, the USA has continued to pursue a multifaceted containment policy, which includes economic and ideational containment targeting China, and precludes China's integration into the liberal international order.
A commentary from China's official news agency, Xinhua, denounced the 'pivot to Asia' policy as 'corrosive to the region's peace and stability', and stated that the USA should 'come up with … an epitaph to the pivot' if Washington sincerely wanted a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific (Liu 2016) . The resentment against the US rebalancing policy can further be seen from China's first White Paper on Asia-Pacific security cooperation, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2017. The White Paper not only emphasises the long-term strategy to cement Chinese leadership, but also aims to counter the rebalancing policy. The White Paper directly confronts the 'Fact Sheet' published by the White House in 2015 in relation to Obama's rebalance to Asia and the Pacific. While the USA seeks, as pointed out by the 'Fact Sheet', to 'build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based regional order' (White House 2015; my emphasis), the vision of China's White Paper is of 'common security', 'reject[ing] the idea of security for some countries while leaving the rest insecure' (Heath 2017) , and emphasising that the 'strengthening of military alliances targeted at a third party is not conducive to common security' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). China's White Paper rejects the concept of a 'network of alliances' by calling for all countries to 'pursue partnerships' instead of alliances. Beijing also explicitly voices its opposition to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, arguing that '[f]orming Cold War style military alliances and building global and regional anti-ballistic missile systems will be detrimental to strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as to the development of an inclusive global and regional security framework' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).
In addition, a major reason why emerging powers, and China in particular, initiated the establishment of the AIIB (and, in the case of BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa], the New Development Bank) was their shared frustration with existing multilateral financial institutions, whose voting structures are stacked against emerging countries (see Chan, Lee, and Chan 2012, 64-67; Donnan 2015; Dove 2016; Etzioni 2016; Kastner, Pearson, and Rector 2016) . In short, the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, which included the exclusion of China from the US-led TPP, and the tardiness in embracing China in international financial institutions were collectively perceived by Chinese leaders as concerted actions to block China's rise to prominence in Asia (Ratner 2013; Xue 2016; Zhang Z. 2014) . China began to shift its policy focus to Eurasia as a countermeasure, with an aim of leading this vast region economically and politically. The OBOR initiative, linking China and Eurasia together, is part of Beijing's geopolitical strategy to manage Washington's rebalance policy.
Soft balancing and the AIIB/OBOR
This article argues that the AIIB is part of a Chinese soft-balancing strategy against the USA's strategic rebalance to Asia. In the wake of Obama's 'pivot to Asia' policy, China has created a Eurasian zone of economic influence in its west in order to offset the imminent threat from the USA from the east. OBOR, the Silk Road Fund and the AIIB serve as three major institutions of China's 'Great Game' strategy.
Neorealists argue that a balance of power has yet to be a relic of the Cold War, even after its end. However, because states in the post-Cold War era are less concerned about existential threats to their sovereign territorial integrity, second-tier major powers have mostly abandoned traditional military balancing (Paul 2005, 47) . Instead, soft balancing has become more rational behaviour. Robert Pape states that: soft balancing measures do not directly challenge a unipolar leader's military preponderance, but they can delay, complicate, or increase the costs of using that extraordinary power. Nonmilitary tools, such as international institutions, economic statecraft … can have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a unipolar leader (Pape 2005, 17) .
In explaining the USA's use of soft balancing towards China, Kai He and Huiyun Feng (2008) argue that soft balancing is 'the efforts to undermine the relative power of the threatening state through diplomatic coordination and institutional constraints' (393). They claim that 'the higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security' (363). States will opt for this policy if they 'do not choose to bandwagon with an adversary' while their economic ties are close (393).
Stephen M. Walt (2005, 126) defines soft balancing as the 'conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences-outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support'. States will coordinate with each other if they want to limit the ability of the USA to impose its preferences on them or take unilateral action. Soft balancing will also increase their bargaining power in global negotiations on various issues by showing that they can be less dependent on US power or protection. Soft balancing is likely to occur when a couple of states have a shared preference for checking US power and are confident that their preference is steadfast (Walt 2005, 129-130) . States within the same region will likely be more prone to adopt soft balancing than countries across regions. Chaka Ferguson (2012, 200) further conceptualises soft balancing as a regionalisation policy by defining it as 'nonmilitary alignments of at least two states that are designed to reduce or remove the military presence and external influence of an outside power from a specific region' (my emphasis).
Can the AIIB be accordingly understood as part of China's regional strategy, designed to form and strengthen its regional sphere of influence (Ferguson 2012, 206-207) ? Or, as counterargued by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth (2005) , is there no balance of power today and what remains are simply policy disputes between the two powers? This article claims that international politics has had a role to play in China's decision to establish the AIIB and that, together with OBOR, it is part of a soft-balancing strategy to counter the USA's 'containment' policy in the region. Externally, the AIIB serves to fulfil China's grand strategy of regional order-(re)building, which aims to undermine the hegemony of the USA. An issue, which is to be explored further below, is whether China's regional partners in the soft-balancing strategy hold a steadfast preference with China to constrain US power.
From the AIIB/OBOR to the AIIB and OBOR Although China has been participating in multilateral institutions for decades and has increased its engagement with them since the 1990s, the AIIB is one of the few multilateral institutions that Beijing has initiated and in which it plays a leadership role. During the early stages of the establishment of the AIIB, Chinese officials often linked the AIIB and OBOR together, indicating that the creation of the AIIB (as well as the Silk Road Fund) would help implementation of the OBOR initiative (Lou 2016, 46; Sun 2015; Weiss 2017) . In November 2014, Xi Jinping even bluntly stated that: 'China's inception and joint establishment of the AIIB with some countries is aimed at providing financial support for infrastructure development in countries along the "One Belt, One Road" and promoting economic cooperation' (cited in Sun 2015, 30 ). However, this official expression of the linkage between the AIIB and OBOR was toned down when international concerns over whether the bank would be a Chinese-dominated bank were growing. In order to allay those concerns, Chinese officials differentiated the AIIB from OBOR, emphasising instead that the AIIB would conform to international standards. During a meeting with global executives from 15 companies in mid-2016, Jin Liqun, president of the AIIB, further clarified that the bank was not created exclusively for OBOR, and that it 'would finance infrastructure projects in all emerging market economies even though they don't belong to the Belt and Road Initiative' (cited in Zhong and Xiao 2016) . Nevertheless, the 13 projects that the AIIB has financed in 2016 and 2017 (all joint projects with other multilateral development banks, except loans to Bangladesh and Oman), totalling over US$2 billion, have links with, albeit not being integral to, China's OBOR. 4 It is difficult to deny that the two initiatives are not interrelated. Some even speculate that the AIIB's co-financing with other multilateral development banks in its initial projects is a design to try to separate the AIIB's projects from China's other foreign assistance projects (Weiss 2017, 6) .
After 'delinking' the AIIB from OBOR in official parlance, Beijing wishes for the USA and Japan to join the AIIB in order to enhance the legitimacy of the bank, as well as extend its financial clout. However, even with US and Japanese membership, the geographic foci of its lending on Eurasia would not be changed to benefit US interests. This partly explains why Trump, who is opposed to many of Obama's foreign policy initiatives ranging from the TPP to the Paris Agreement, has not made another dramatic U-turn by joining the AIIB. Furthermore, his administration initially only planned to send Eric Branstand, a rank-and-file official in the Department of Commerce and the son of the USA's incoming ambassador to China, Terry Branstand, to the OBOR forum in Beijing in May 2017. Only after China reached a trade agreement with the USA, on buying more US beef over time, did the USA decide to upgrade the representation of the US delegation to the level of the Senior Director for Asia of the National Security Council (but not up to the secretary level) (Lopez 2017; Perlez and Huang 2017) . Overall, the USA, under both the Obama and Trump administrations, has been sceptical about joining both the AIIB and OBOR, which are perceived as China-led projects to offset US global influence.
A rebalancing of China's geostrategy
In 2015, China and Pakistan signed an agreement to commence building a US$46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC has since become the flagship project of OBOR and is seen as a countervailing measure to the US 'pivot'. The CPEC can be dated back to 2006 when Islamabad proposed to Beijing a Trade and Energy Corridor that would include the development of Gwadar Port, upgrading the Karakoram Highway, and building railways and pipelines to connect Pakistan with western China for trade and transport-energy purposes (Fazal-ur-Rahman 2007) . Before Washington's 'pivot to Asia', despite Islamabad's offer of the use of Pakistan as the site of a 'trade corridor', 'energy corridor' and 'transport hub' in the region, Beijing showed 'marginal interest in the idea' (Fazal-ur-Rahman 2007, 54) . When Islamabad called for bids for the contract to operate Gwadar Port, China's state-owned companies showed little interest and did not submit any bids. The running of the port was granted to a Singaporean company for 40 years. China's lukewarm response to the Trade and Energy Corridor was believed to be mainly due to its concern over upsetting the USA when it was widely speculated that Gwadar would become a Chinese naval base, and any move from China might potentially touch a nerve in the USA. In addition, Pakistan's re-engagement with the USA post-9/11 also made China cautious about its investment in Pakistan (Fazal-ur-Rahman 2007) .
However, since 2012-13, China has become more proactive, and announced the CPEC project a month before Xi Jinping outlined an OBOR proposal in Kazakhstan in September 2013. 5 In addition, when the lease of Gwadar Port to the Singaporean company was terminated by a Pakistani court in 2013, China showed its interest in the port, and a Chinese state-owned firm, China Overseas Ports Holding Company, was given the right to operate it without going through any open bidding process.
6 Informants in Islamabad believe that China's shifting attitude towards the CPEC was primarily triggered by Obama's rebalancing policy and a growing India's assertiveness in the region. 7 One of the major infrastructure projects of the CPEC is to build an 887 kilometre highway, N35, to connect the port of Gwadar in south-western Pakistan with Kashgar in Xinjiang, China. Gwadar, a gateway to the oil-exporting Gulf countries, is only 120 kilometres from the Iranian border. This port is not only of geostrategic importance, but also helps to shorten the crude-oil shipping time to China from the Middle East by as much as 85 percent (Chan and Lee 2017, 24) .
Within China, in order to counter the USA's strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, which was widely understood and perceived by China as a policy to contain the rise of China, Chinese international relations experts have been advising the Chinese government on new policy ideas. In October 2012, Wang Jisi of Peking University's School of International Studies proposed a 'Marching West' (西進) strategy to counteract both the USA's 'pivot to Asia' policy and a 'New Silk Road' initiative unveiled by Hillary Clinton in November 2011. 8 Wang explained the logic behind this westward policy by pointing out that, compared with countries in South-East Asia, none of the countries lying to the west of China, with the exception of India, have any conflict with China. China is in a well-placed position to collaborate with them in the areas of geo-economics and geopolitics. In addition, as many powers, such as the USA, Russia, India and Japan, have gradually shifted their economic and security foci to the central and Eurasian regions, China should not limit itself to East Asian states only. Rather, China should cooperate with the countries to its west to generate a strategically friendly environment, which will also be conducive to managing the tripartite threats of terrorism, (religious) extremism and separatism (the 'three evil forces') to the north-western region of Xinjiang (Wang 2012 ).
Xue Li (2015, 69) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also contends that the primary strategic objective of OBOR is to resolve the negative effects the USA's 'pivot to Asia' policy might have on China. Some also argue that in facing the USA's encirclement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, OBOR acts as an 'enforceable policy' to promote economic and security cooperation in the Eurasian region (Li and Cai 2015) . Zheng Anguang (2015) of Nanjing University holds that China's strategies in Central Asia should shift from being reactive to proactive, and that the OBOR initiative should be seen as Beijing's diplomatic strategy to build a new regional order. Within this new geostrategic framework, the AIIB and Silk Road Fund were set up to strengthen the infrastructure facility in the region that is desperately needed.
Economic soft balancing: a Eurasian trading bloc
As Pape (2005, 37 ) has argued, a major element of soft balancing is to enhance the relative economic power of the weaker state through the creation of a regional trading bloc that will promote intra-regional trade and economic growth for its members only. For China, the first step towards establishing a regional trading bloc in Eurasia is to break out of the 'dollar trap' (Prasad 2014) . While China's foreign exchange reserves have been growing (until very recently) as a result of its export-led economic growth, the bulk are used to buy US-dollar-denominated assets, especially US Treasury bonds. The huge purchase of US Treasury bonds helps Washington to finance its budget deficits and public debts, enabling the Federal Reserve to keep the USA's interest rates low. The global financial crisis of 2007-8 incurred substantial losses of Chinese investment in US dollar assets, especially in both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
9 There have been concerns within the country about the adverse impacts of this 'dollar trap' policy, pointing out the low return and the risk of the financial investment, and the concomitant need to lower inflationary pressure inside China. A policy measure to reduce the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, as well as exposure to US dollar assets, is to internationalise the Chinese currency by encouraging the use and circulation of the renminbi outside China. The AIIB is an institution that helps to redirect China's foreign exchange reserves away from US assets into investment in infrastructure in neighbouring countries. It is even envisaged that, eventually, it will offer loans in the renminbi rather than US dollars, and part of the loans will be used to purchase Chinese equipment and labour services (Mallaby and Wethington 2012; Ren 2016; Yu 2011; Zhang 2015) .
Concomitantly with the internationalisation of the renminbi, the AIIB and OBOR place emphasis on 'connectivity' with Eurasian states, which has the potential to create a 'regional trading bloc' that would exclude the USA. If someday the AIIB issues loans in the renminbi, it will likely reduce demand for US dollars as the world's reserve currency and, accordingly, undermine US economic hegemony (Pape 2005, 42) . When comparing the TPP and OBOR, Chinese scholars tend to believe that while the TPP is a rules-based economic cooperation mechanism, OBOR is a development-oriented initiative and type of public good that China provides to the region and beyond . Xia Xianliang (2015) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing has even bluntly stated that to counter the USA's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, the OBOR initiative will help expand China's economic and trade cooperation between Europe, Asia and Africa. This will change the world economic and financial order and investment patterns, and eventually put China back at the centre of the world's economy, which position China has lost since the nineteenth century, during the Qing dynasty.
In short, the AIIB has been founded to serve a grand strategy of China's regional orderbuilding. It is one of the institutional means to lend financial support to the OBOR initiative and to counter the USA's 'hegemonic intrusion' in the Asia-Pacific, as well as its dominance over international finance. China does have an incentive to balance softly against a unipolar world that constrains it from becoming a great power. Looking at the membership of the AIIB, China has already enticed close allies of the USA into its fold. Among the Group of Seven, only Japan and the USA have not yet applied for membership of the AIIB. The remaining question is: How effective is China's soft-balancing strategy? One criterion is whether the soft-balancing measures 'can delay, complicate, or increase the costs of using [the] extraordinary power' of the hegemon (Pape 2005, 17 ).
How effective is China's soft balancing?
The Chinese scholar Lou Wei (2016, 43) argues that the emergence of a dichotomy between 'an economic dependence on China and a security reliance on the United States' has created political space for China to counter the USA's 'pivot to Asia' policy. To what extent is China able to utilise the business opportunities created by both the AIIB and OBOR to undermine the USA's rebalancing strategy? This section will use Australia and South Korea, two of the USA's major allies in the Asia-Pacific, as case studies to assess the effectiveness of China's soft balancing.
Australia
Well before the establishment of the AIIB, Canberra had shown its interest in participating in the institution. Joe Hockey, then treasurer, admitted that membership would create opportunities for Australian companies to sell more commodities to Asian consumers (Coorey 2016 ). Tony Abbott, the then prime minster, also agreed to attend the launching ceremony, where he would have signed a memorandum of understanding in Beijing in October 2014. However, just days before the ceremony, Abbott announced that he would be absent. It was speculated that this was mainly due to pressure from the USA. John Kerry, the then US Secretary of State, piled mounting pressure on Australia to stay out of the AIIB during his meeting with Abbott in Jakarta following the inauguration of the Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, in October 2014 (Reuters 2014) . After the UK declared its support for the new bank in March 2015, however, Australia swiftly followed suit and became a founding member. Three months later, Canberra was 'awarded' a free trade agreement with Beijing. However, unlike France, Germany and the UK, Australia has not been given a key managing role in the bank, even though it is the sixth-largest shareholder and a regional member of the AIIB. The five vice-presidents of the bank are citizens of France, Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK (AIIB 2016a). It is widely speculated that Canberra missed the opportunity of a vice-presidency because it delayed joining due to political pressure from the USA and Japan (Coorey 2016) .
What tangible benefits will Australia likely gain with AIIB membership? With Asia making up 60 percent of global infrastructure spending in the next decade, Australian mining, construction and service industries will potentially benefit from being a member of this infrastructure bank. It is argued that the AIIB will suit Australian needs better than the existing institutions dominated by Americans and Europeans (McHugh 2016; Wpengine 2015) . China is the biggest market for Australian exports. More than 30 percent of its US$243 billion in exports in 2014 went to China.
10 One of the potential beneficiaries is the coal-mining industry, with Australia accounting for around one-third of all coal trade in the world. The major markets for its coal exports are China, Japan, South Korea and other countries in Asia.
At the time of writing (May-June 2017), the AIIB was going through its final round of public consultations on its future energy strategy, which would serve as a guide for the bank's future engagement with, and investments in, the energy sector. After the final round of consultations, the strategy would be presented to the bank's board of directors for a final decision in June 2017 (Marray 2017a ). According to the AIIB's first draft guidelines on the bank's energy strategy, published in October 2016, in order to meet the demand for energy growth in the region while at the same time transitioning to a lower carbon future, the Asian region will need investment of US$8740 billion in infrastructure improvement between 2016 and 2025 (AIIB 2016a). Jin Liqun of the AIIB has promised that the bank will be a 'green bank' with an emphasis on renewable power, such as hydropower. The guidelines mentioned above also indicate that 'fossil fuel production, transport and consumption have severe negative impacts' on densely populated cities in Asia. While the guidelines do not completely reject the use of coal and oil, in line with the World Bank's and the Asian Development Bank's coal financing policies, 11 the AIIB states that 'coal-and oil-fired power plants would exceptionally be considered if cleaner technologies are not available for well-founded energy security or affordability reasons' (ibid.; my emphasis). While the bank is finalising its energy plan, Canberra, unlike other developed countries, has lobbied hard for the AIIB to include coal in its lending priorities (Smyth and Hornby 2016) . The Minerals Council of Australia, the country's biggest industry lobby group, has criticised the AIIB's draft guidelines for ignoring clean coal technologies. The Business Council of Australia also wrote to the AIIB, claiming that Australia's higher-quality coal could help curb the increase of carbon-dioxide emissions in Asia. With a strong interest in preserving her country's overseas markets, Kate Williams, a Treasury spokeswoman, stated that: 'The [Australian] government wants the AIIB energy strategy to acknowledge that fossil fuels will play a significant role in energy generation in the region for decades to come' (ibid.).
12
Membership will potentially allow the Australian government to influence the bank's policy from within. Apart from this, other tangible benefits will come along too. For example, as already mentioned, three months after Australia confirmed its participation in the AIIB, the country signed a free trade agreement with China in June 2015. In addition to the AIIB projects, the countries along OBOR will be other major export markets for Australia. As noted above, the AIIB has engaged closely with the OBOR initiative. For example, as part of its OBOR flagship project, China signed an agreement with Pakistan to commence their US$46 billion CPEC in 2015. As part of the CPEC initiative, agreements were signed in early February 2017 between China and Pakistan to build two coal-fired power plants with a total capacity of 1650 megawatts in Hub, Balochistan and Thar, Sindh (Marray 2017b) . Australia may potentially provide material products and services for these two projects, as well as other OBOR-related ones. As argued by Lai-Ha Chan and Pak K. Lee (2017) , the AIIB does not exist alone. It is an-albeit not the -institutional means to carry out a larger Chinese project to transform the Eurasian regional order. Both the AIIB and OBOR are linked together as part of China's soft-rebalancing strategy in the region.
However, Australia is on the horns of a dilemma in its relationship with China and the USA. While there is little doubt that China has been the primary source of Australia's economic growth since 2008, Canberra has relied on the USA as a regional security provider since World War II. Some argue that Canberra should 'cut the tag' with US foreign policy as it cannot risk supporting the USA at the expense of its trading relationship with China (Sales and Wearring 2016) . Others counter that Australia should remain in an alliance with the USA and that, as a liberal democracy, Australia is ideologically closer to the USA than China. This was manifest in the failure of the Australian legislature to ratify the China-Australia extradition treaty in late March 2017 shortly after Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to Canberra. It indicated Australia's long-standing concerns over China's human rights record and its state-controlled criminal justice system.
13 Canberra also declined to endorse Beijing's proposal to align and link Australia's AU$5 billion Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility to China's New Silk Road initiative during Li Keqiang's visit (Riordan 2017) . Sino-Australian relations soured after it was revealed in early June 2017, when the US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State were visiting Australia, that China allegedly tried to meddle in Australia's domestic politics by funnelling political donations to the Liberal Party of Australia and the Australian Labor Party through the Chinese business diaspora in the country. The Australian prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, was quoted as warning the Chinese government that: 'Just as modern China was based on an assertion of national sovereignty, so China should always respect the sovereignty of other nations, including, of course, our own' (quoted in Smyth 2017b; see also McKenzie, Koloff, and Davies 2017). While Australia does not want to be left out of the lucrative infrastructure investment opportunities arising from the AIIB/OBOR, at the same time it perceives a non-democratic China as a potential threat to its national security and political values.
Overall, China's soft-balancing strategy has achieved some, albeit far from complete, success, as Australia is treading a thin line between seeking closer economic ties with China and preserving strong political and military relations with the USA. So far, Australia has avoided taking sides.
South Korea
South Korea is the fifth-largest shareholder of the AIIB. Like Australia, not long after Seoul's commitment to being a founding member of the AIIB, it sealed a free trade agreement with China in November 2014. China is also the biggest trading partner of South Korea, accounting for 25 percent of the country's total exports. As a regional member and the fifth-largest shareholder, Korea had one of its nationals, Hong Ky-ttack, appointed as one of the five vice-presidents and the chief risk officer at the AIIB in February 2016. However, after Hong was allegedly involved in a corruption scandal related to his previous job at the Korean Development Bank, he applied for six months' leave from the bank in June 2016. While Seoul was seeking a replacement for Hong from within its own country, the AIIB swiftly appointed a French national, Thierry de Longuemar, a former vice-president of the Asian Development Bank, to replace Hong in September 2016 (AIIB 2016b). It was widely speculated that the removal of a vice-president position from South Korea was linked to Seoul's intention to deploy THAAD (Shim 2016) .
For some years, South Korea has tried to balance its relations with the USA and China. While Seoul has relied on the USA for security protection since the Korean War, its increasing economic ties with China have put Seoul in a strategic dilemma with regard to its relations with the USA and China. Given that China is the only benefactor of North Korea, President Park Geun-hye (in office from 2013-17) hoped that the strength of Sino-Republic of Korea economic and diplomatic relations would influence Beijing's policy towards Pyongyang. Her attendance at the military parade on China's commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II in Beijing in 2015, while the leaders of many Western countries were absent, clearly demonstrated President Park's intention to strengthen relations with China (Heritage 2017, 164-165 ). However, North Korea's increasing militarised activities, such as ballistic missile testing in 2012-14 and its fourth and fifth nuclear tests in January and September 2016, in defiance of China, have amply demonstrated that Beijing has limited leverage over Kim Jong-un, who has yet to have a summit meeting with Xi Jinping since his ascent to power in December 2011 (Cha 2017) . Accordingly, the Obama administration wanted to upgrade its shield capabilities in South Korea from 2014 onwards. South Korea dragged its heels until late 2016, after Pyongyang launched three ballistic missiles in August of that year (Heritage 2017, 167) . Despite strong domestic opposition and Beijing's opposition to its deployment, South Korea finally agreed to deploy the missile system in December 2016, and deployment started in February 2017. Both Washington and Seoul claim that THAAD is a defence system and a necessary defensive response to North Korean leader Kim Jongun's belligerent behaviour, particularly concerning the reclusive regime's frequent ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing since 2012.
However, China has been infuriated by the USA's deployment of a missile shield in the region. It sees the system as a threat to its security and part of the 'containment' strategy set by the USA. The radar and tracking components of THAAD can also be readily used as surveillance equipment, capturing the activities of the Chinese military due to the geographical proximity of the two countries. Chinese scholars are also convinced that the system is all about containing China, rather than defending South Korea from its northern brethren. They believe that the USA persuaded an only partly willing South Korea to agree to the deployment of THAAD in order to fit with the broader US security strategy to contain China (He 2016; Zhao 2016) .
14 The day after parts of the THAAD components were delivered to Seongju, south-east of Seoul, on 6 March 2017, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly emphasised that: 'we [the Chinese government] firmly oppose the deployment of THAAD … and we will resolutely take necessary measures to defend our security interests' (Rauhala 2017) . In suspected retaliation, Beijing is employing economic statecraft to offset the imminent threat that it believes is coming from the USA.
15 It has imposed informal economic sanctions on South Korean firms in various sectors, ranging from cosmetics, supermarket chains and automobiles to tourism. Members of South Korea's entertainment industry, such as movie stars and pop singers, are also banned from performing in China. The target that has been hit the hardest is the Lotte Group, a Korean conglomerate, after the company agreed to a land-swap deal with the South Korean government in February 2017, which allowed the THAAD system to be deployed to a golf course owned by Lotte in Seongju. The Chinese website of the conglomerate's affiliated company, Lotte Duty Free, was the target of cyberattacks. The construction of the company's multi-billion-dollar real-estate project in China was also suspended immediately after the land-swap deal . Another affiliated company, Lotte Mart, has also been caught up in the THAAD dispute since the announcement of THAAD's deployment in July 2016. Accordingly, its business in China reported a loss of over US$88 million in 2016. Three of its retail stores in Beijing also had to close that same year (Duo 2017; Hernández, Guo, and McMorrow 2017). 16 At the beginning of the economic boycott, South Korea did not bow to the mounting economic pressure from China. Its legislature passed, in late March 2017, a bipartisan resolution, expressing 'deep concern and regret' over China's retaliatory measures against its companies. Its ambassador to China called on China's ministries of foreign affairs, commerce and public security to put an end to the sanctions against Lotte. Informal complaints against China were also made at the World Trade Organization (Jun 2017 ). However, soon after the election of Moon Jae-in of the centre-left party, the Minjoo Party of Korea, 17 South Korea decided in June 2017 to suspend the deployment of THAAD for a year. Moon seems to be adopting a middle-of-the-road policy on defence. The missile shield has a total of six rocket launchers. Two of them were deployed before the presidential election and will not be withdrawn by the new government. However, the deployment of the remaining four launchers has been suspended, pending an environmental impact assessment (Harris and Harding 2017) . On the surface, it seems that China's soft balancing has delayed, complicated or increased the costs of the USA's 'pivot to Asia' policy.
Concluding remarks
This article began by putting forward a neorealist account, focusing on the use of soft balancing to undermine US military hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, to complement the existing economic and commercial explanations for China's decision to found a multilateral development bank on its soil. Consistent with Pape's (2005, 17) argument, China's soft balancing does not directly challenge the USA's military preponderance, but has 'a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects' of the USA. China has increasingly utilised its growing economic clout to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The establishment of the AIIB (and OBOR) serves as part of its soft-economic-balancing strategy to fend off Washington's 'containment' policy. Thus far, this soft-balancing strategy seems to have attained some of its expected results by impaling the USA's Asian allies on the horns of a dilemma, depriving them of the chance to benefit from both economic and security gains from the USA. In order to reap the rewards of China's rise, all of the USA's key allies, apart from Japan, are members of the AIIB.
Following on from this account of soft balancing, this article has also examined how Beijing capitalises on its growing economic prowess to employ a Chinese regionalisation strategy, aimed at creating a regional trading bloc in Eurasia, to weave a spell over the USA's key allies in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific in order to counter US and Japanese opposition to the AIIB. Growing interest in the AIIB and OBOR may bear testimony to the relative decline of the USA in economic and financial governance. This article echoes G. John Ikenberry's (2016) observation that a 'dual hierarchy' is emerging in East Asia in which the USA can only maintain a security hierarchy, while an economic hierarchy is now under China's domination. US withdrawal from the TPP in early 2017 under the Trump presidency, which followed the launch of the AIIB and OBOR, will only help China tighten its grip on the East Asian economic hierarchy. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership could potentially serve as an alternative to the TPP. The Trump administration's decisions to slash funding to the Department of State and foreign aid program in 2017 may inadvertently help China strengthen its role and influence in international development. 18 However, there are limitations to China's soft balancing. The USA is managing to maintain its security hierarchy in the region, even as China is dominating the economic hierarchy. In spite of signs in the early days of the Trump presidency that US-Australia relations would become strained (Thrush and Innis 2017) , the Trump administration has not been prepared to withdraw US military deployment and commitments to Australia. 19 Meetings between the senior leaders of the two countries have continued. 20 In addition, whether China's lashing out with economic sanctions against South Korea will eventually push Seoul to give up the deployment of THAAD and weaken the US alliance network is not clear, although the deployment has been suspended for a year. As illustrated above, Australia and South Korea, both with democratic systems, do not share with a nondemocratic China a belief that the USA and US hegemony pose a security threat to them. They still remain allied, politically and militarily, with the USA, and rely on Washington as their sole security provider, guarding against threats emanating from authoritarian regimes. Even with its growing economic clout, China is failing to undermine Western democratic solidarity. An implication of this study for further research in international relations is whether a non-democratic country can effectively soft-balance against a democratic hegemon. Which countries have shared and steadfast preferences with China to check the power of the democratic hegemon? Notes totalling US$301 million), Azerbaijan (US$600 million) and India (US$160 million) (see Chan and Lee 2017 ). 12. Interestingly, the Australian government has actively promoted the benefits of coal power.
According to the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, if the existing coalfired power stations were replaced with more efficient 'ultra-supercritical' coal-fired power stations, the country could cut its greenhouse emissions by 27 percent. However, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation estimates that the new ultrasupercritical black coal would cost AU$3100 to build per kilowatt and, in order to achieve the reduction, it would require 20 gigawatts of new capacity, which would cost more than AU$60 billion, according to Dylan McConnell, a scientist at the University of Melbourne.
McConnell points out that if renewable energy was to be used to achieve a 27 percent reduction in emissions, it would require approximately 13-19 gigawatts of renewable energy, costing only AU$24-34 billion-half of the government's new coal-power plan (see Slezak 2017a Slezak , 2017b . 13. The extradition treaty was concluded between China and Australia under the Howard government in 2007, but was awaiting ratification by the Australian legislature. The Australian government pulled a parliamentary vote to ratify it in late March 2017, just days after the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Australia, where he stressed the importance of tackling cross-border crime between the two countries. The failure to ratify the treaty was mainly due to cross-party concerns over inadequate protections for human rights, as well as the nonexistence of the rule of law in China. During Li's visit, the Chinese government detained Chongyi Feng, an Australian permanent resident and a professor at the University of Technology Sydney, in southern China, preventing him from leaving China after his research in the country had concluded (Boreham 2017; Smyth 2017a ). 14. Experts outside China have argued that China's concerns are overstated because the USA has already gained access to the radar systems in Qatar, Taiwan and Japan, which can be used to monitor Chinese missile tests. What China really wants is, rather, to close the door on the possibility of further deployment of more advanced anti-missile systems along the Chinese periphery (Buckley 2017) . 15. Economic statecraft can be defined as the use of economic instruments, inducements and/or sanctions to influence the actual and potential behaviour of other international actors (Baldwin 1985, 40-42; Zhang S. G. 2014, 2) . 16. China and South Korea concluded a free trade agreement in November 2014, and the agreement came into force in December 2015, not long after South Korea applied to be a founding member of the AIIB. However, the decision to deploy THAAD in July 2016 has put the relations between these two countries on hold. Geopolitics and economics are mixing together. The suspected retaliation also involves mobilisation of the Chinese population to boycott Korean products. For example, 3400 Chinese cruise tourists, who were travelling as part of a reward organised by a Chinese company, arrived in Jeju, South Korea, on 11
March 2017, but refused to disembark, even though 80 buses had been arranged and were waiting to take them to the duty-free shops in Jeju (Linder 2017) . 17. Arguing that economic sanctions failed to prevent Pyongyang from proceeding with its nuclear weapons program, Moon calls for a less confrontational approach in dealing with the North. He and his liberal supporters are also loath to let their country be drawn into hegemonic conflicts or wars between major powers (Choe 2017 
